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ARTICLES
CHURCHES AND THE FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION
JOHN H. GARVEY*
The first amendment says that "Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. This rule is
most often used to protect individuals (religious speakers, paci-
fists, people claiming public benefits.)' This is hardly surpris-
ing. We naturally think that free exercise is an individual right,
as we think that religion is a personal and private affair. I want
to dispute (more modestly, to qualify) that view. I will argue
that we should (sometimes) see the freedom of religion as a
group right, which can conflict with, and take precedence over,
individual rights.
As a way of making these points, I want to consider the law
about disputes over church property. The cause of such a dis-
pute is often a schism. A local congregation divides over some
controversial issue and can no longer live together under the
same roof. Or a local church wants to split off from a larger
religious community. Who gets the building and the land it sits
on?
These fights involve real estate, so they are generally
fought in the state courts. But the Supreme Court has
addressed their constitutional aspects on several occasions, and
its views have recently undergone some change. I will begin by
stating the first amendment rules that the Court has laid down.
I then want to examine the principles behind these rules. I will
argue that there are actually two distinct principles, which
sometimes point in opposite directions. The first is a principle
of individual freedom. The second is a principle of group free-
dom. Under the Court's rules, the two principles collide (and
the first generally prevails) when church factions have failed to
* Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, College of
Law.
1. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480
U.S. 136 (1987); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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provide in advance for the unhappy contingency of discord. I
will suggest that in these cases we should opt for the principle
of group freedom.
I. THE RULES GOVERNING CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES
The oddest aspect of this corner of the law is that the
Court has allowed the states to choose between two rules for
resolving church property disputes,2 and the rules can produce
diametrically opposite results. The first is the rule of "neutral
principles"; the second is the rule of "deference" (to some
authority in the church polity).
The neutral principles rule is the Court's most recent pro-
nouncement on the subject. 3 Suppose that the local Presbyte-
rian church, a member of the Presbyterian Church of the
United States, wishes to sever ties with the general church on
account of its decision to ordain women. There then ensues a
dispute between the local and the general church over who
shall control the building and land hitherto used by the local
church. The neutral principles rule solves this dispute in two
steps. The first is to collect the relevant documents-the deed,
the corporate charter of the local church (if it has one), the con-
stitution of the general church-and apply to them the usual
principles of trust and property law.4 The deed. might give title
to the local church (incorporated as a membership corpora-
tion), or to trustees chosen by the local church (organized as a
trustee corporation, or as an unincorporated association).5 But
the local church's charter or the general church's constitution
might contain an express trust provision in favor of the general
church. One or the other might say, for example, that "[a]ll
real property now or hereafter acquired by the local church
shall be held in trust for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian
2. [T]he First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow
a particular method of resolving church property disputes. Indeed,
"a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church
property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal
matters[.]"
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (quoting Maryland & Va. Churches v.
Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original)).
3. It was developed in 1979 in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
4. Some courts will restrict their inquiry even more narrowly and look
only at the language in the deed to the property. This is called the "formal
title" doctrine. See, e.g., Maryland & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan,J.,
concurring).
5. See Kauper & Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L. REV.
1499, 1538-43 (1973).
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Church of the United States." 6 If there is no such reservation,
the local church wins.
Step two is necessary when it is not clear who the "local
church" is. If the pastor, the local administrative body, and the
congregation are unanimous in their desire to sever ties with
the general church, this question does not arise. But suppose
that the local congregation is divided 200-150. Which faction
should a court side with? Here neutral principles favor a pre-
sumption of majority rule.7 The minority can rebut the pre-
sumption by pointing to some provision in the local charter, or
in the constitution of the general church, dealing with identity
of local churches. But if the court really sticks to neutral princi-
ples, the minority may be hard put to make this rebuttal. Rules
of ecclesiastical governance cannot easily be stated in neutral
(i.e., secular legal) terms. Suppose that the general church con-
stitution directs its governing body to "order whatever pertains
to the spiritual welfare of the churches under its care. '"8
Whether this embraces questions of property management
depends on how one interprets the term "spiritual welfare,"
and that is a theological question. If this is the only available
rebuttal, either the local majority wins or the court must depart
from neutral principles.
Let me turn now from neutral principles to the rule of def-
erence. This rule is easier to state. It is this: if a court finds
that there is a mechanism of church government with authority
to decide the property dispute, the court must defer to the
decision of that body.9 I must clarify two points about this
statement. If there has been a schism and the church govern-
ment favors faction A, faction B will dispute the church's gov-
ernmental authority. Hence the court must determine
authoritativeness from an ex ante perspective. For purposes of
making this determination the Supreme Court distinguishes
between hierarchical and congregational churches. The former
is a general organization of churches "having similar faith and
doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical
6. Cf Wolf, 443 U.S. at 600 n.2.
7. It is not self-evident that they should. If a majority of the people of
Kentucky voted to secede from the Union we would not respect their wishes.
But the neutral principles approach does, as I am about to explain, let the
minority show that the local church is like Kentucky in this respect.
8. See 14olf, 443 U.S. at 609 n.7, (quoting the BooK OF CHURCH ORDER
OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH § 16-7(19) (1972)).
9. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
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head."' Here the Court recognizes as authoritative the deci-
sion of the highest tribunal within the church organization. A
congregational church is an autonomous local unit. While it
might affiliate with a larger organization, it may also withdraw
at will." Here the Court generally follows the wishes of the
majority, and the rule of deference merges with the rule of neu-
tral principles.' 2
The authority of the church polity depends on the nature
of the dispute as well as on the church's internal organization.
Suppose there is no schism and faction B concedes, even expost,
the authority of church tribunals over matters within their juris-
diction. Faction B might still argue that the church tribunals
lack authority over this particular dispute, because it involves
no religious issues. In principle this objection is sound. If the
local pastor buys a car from a member of his congregation and
fails to pay, the matter is not one for a church court. But
church property disputes invariably involve issues of "doctrine
and practice"' 3 (in our example, the ordination of women).
And in such cases the courts will not inquire into the jurisdic-
tion of church tribunals.' 4
10. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110. See also Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 726.
This is obviously a very rough cut. We might subdivide it further into
episcopal and presbyterian forms. The former give all authority to certain
ecclesiastical officers. Examples include the Episcopal, Methodist, Roman
Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox Churches. The latter give authority "to an
ascending succession of judicatories composed of laymen as well as
ministers." Examples include the United Presbyterian Church of North
America, the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and the Assemblies of
God. See Adams & Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1292 n.6 (1980).
11. Examples include the Quakers, Jewish congregations, the Church
of Christ, and the numerous Baptist bodies. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 10,
at 1292 n.6.
12. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); Watson, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724-25.
13. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 616 (Powell, J., dissenting).
14. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713-14.
If the church tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, it will award the
property to the party holding what it considers to be orthodox views in the
underlying dispute. A donor of property might preclude this result by
including an express dedication in his deed or will. "If, for example, the
donor expressly gives his church some money on the condition that the
church never ordain a woman as a minister or elder .... he is entitled to his
money back if the condition is not fulfilled." Presbyterian Church v. Hull
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 452 (1969) (HarlanJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
But such dedications are unenforceable if they require the court to decide a
religious question. That makes drafting difficult, because it is precisely
matters of faith that such donors are interested in. See Mansfield, The Religion
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II. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
In Section I, I tried to show that the Court has proposed
two different rules, and that the rules can lead to conflicting
results. In this section I want to look at one explanation for
those rules. Both of them can be seen as efforts to promote the
goal of individual freedom (though the rule of neutral princi-
ples promotes it more vigorously, which explains why the rules
sometimes conflict). There are three aspects to this freedom,
and they have a curiously alphabetic character: association,
belief, and contract. I must apologize for taking them up out of
alphabetical order.
A. Freedom of Contract
One might say that in devising rules to resolve church
property disputes, the Court has tried to protect the private
ordering of religious activity through voluntary agreements.
The rule of neutral principles, for example, can be overridden
by contract:
[T]he neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar
genius of private-law systems in general-flexibility in
ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the
intentions of the parties....
... At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties
can ensure [any desired disposition of property]. They
can modify the deeds or the corporate charter .... Alter-
natively, the constitution of the general church can be
made to recite an express trust .... And the civil courts
will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the
parties .... 5
The rule of deference, though it seems to squelch individuals
in the name of corporate religion, is also sometimes justified by
freedom of contract.
"The right to organize voluntary religious associa-
tions . . . and to create tribunals for the decision of con-
troverted questions of faith.., is unquestioned. All who
unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied
consent to this government, and are bound to submit to
it. But it would be a vain consent. . . if any one aggrieved
by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular
courts and have them reversed."
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 847, 866-68 (1984).
15. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603-06.
1990]
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• .."[T]he decisions of the proper church tribunals
... are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so
by contract or otherwise." '1 6
According to this view people get together and organize
churches by a kind of corporate contract. Membership is vol-
untary. New members consent to the rules when they contract
in. And the parties can rewrite the contract at any time before
a dispute arises. The Court does not say why church property
rules should preserve this contractual system, but there is an
obvious explanation. It is that freedom of contract is a way of
exercising and enlarging the autonomy of the individual con-
tractors. It lets people do what they want, and secure the aid of
others in doing so. This is particularly important here, where
what people want to do is to practice their religion. 7 In short,
freedom of contract serves the free exercise of religion.
B. Freedom of Association
The contracts the Court has in mind, however, are not sim-
ple two-party agreements. They bind together a number of
people, like the contracts that create corporations. In fact the
contracts in question often do create corporations. People may
organize a church body as a membership corporation. (The
members are the corporate body, but they do not hold stock.) 8
They may also write a constitution for the general church-a
kind of social contract for a religious society. When property
disputes arise, the parties to the dispute will usually be bodies
of this kind-the local church, the general church-and not
individual members.
But according to the principle of individual freedom, these
groups are nothing more than aggregations of their members.
Joining together to form a group is just a more complex ver-
sion of contracting. We call it freedom of association rather
than freedom of contract, but the difference is one of size
rather than kind.19
16. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 711-12, (quoting Watson,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29, and Gonzalez v. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S.
1, 16 (1929)). See also Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 446-47.
17. See generally C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Ellman, Driven
from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
1378, 1400-21 (1981).
18. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 5, at 1539-40.
19. Cf. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 199-200 n.14
(Cook ed. 1923); A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 178 (J. Mayer
& M. Lerner ed. 1966).
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It follows that associations (church groups) have, in the
final analysis, no independent interest of their own in freedom
of religion. Though they can be parties to litigation and hold
title to real estate, those are procedural devices for simplifying
the unwieldy process of adjusting a multitude of individual
claims. Associations exist to promote the freedom of their
members. As Ira Mark Ellman notes: "[I]t is hard to see how
the central organization could have any independently derived
rights. The organizational entity deserves constitutional pro-
tection because it is an instrument of the faithful in advancing
their religious beliefs." 20
Dissent presents a difficulty for this view of churches. How
can a church be said to serve its members when they are
divided (say, over the ordination of women)? The membership
contract provides one solution. If people who join the church
agree to be bound by decisions from which they dissent, the
church serves this larger intention of each member even in
cases of division. But suppose that a court cannot find such an
agreement?"' In that event the principle of freedom of associa-
tion suggests that the fractured church should subdivide into
smaller, less fractious groups, each of which can serve its mem-
bers without internal conflict. In that event, to put it bluntly,
schism is a good thing.
The rule of neutral principles carries out this idea22 by let-
ting local groups split off from the general church and take
their property with them.2" Dissent within local churches is a
20. Ellman, supra note 17, at 1404. See also Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A
"Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 275
(1986); Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on
Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1584-85 (1987);
Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment
Discrimination, 67 B.U.L. REV. 391, 422 (1987); Lupu, Keeping the Faith:
Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 761-
78 (1986); Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SuP. CT.
REV. 83.
21. This will frequently happen since, as I will explain presently, courts
are not permitted to interpret the rules of internal governance expressed in
ecclesiastical documents.
22. This is not the only idea behind the rule. Another is the idea that
courts should not decide religious issues, which I discuss below.
23. This is not its inevitable effect. The general church can avoid it by
taking title to local property in advance of a dispute, or by putting careful
language in the local charter or the general constitution. Compare Carnes v.
Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976) with
Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259,
167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970), Maryland & Va.
Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Jones v. Wolf, 443
1990]
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trickier problem. They too can be subdivided into smaller,
more harmonious groups, but one of them will be left without a
church to worship in.24 Under these circumstances majority
rule best carries out the ideal of individual freedom. If our ulti-
mate concern is the religious liberty of the individual members
(and if we assume that one member's liberty is as important as
another's), the best we can do is to satisfy as many individuals
as possible. This has long been the solution for property dis-
putes in congregational churches. But the rule of neutral prin-
ciples lets courts also apply it (at the local level) to hierarchical
churches.
C. Freedom of Belief
Freedom of association and freedom of contract go a long
way toward explaining the rules of neutral principles and defer-
ence that the Court has applied to church property disputes,
but they are not the only principles at work. Another factor in
the equation-in fact, the one most frequently mentioned-is
the undesirability of having civil courts decide "questions of
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law."25
It is a strong point in favor of both the neutral principles rule
and the rule of deference that they make such an inquiry
unnecessary-the former by tying the outcome to property and
trust law,26 the latter by deferring to the decisions of church
courts.2 7 The Court rejected a third rule (the departure-from-
doctrine rule, which I discuss below) precisely because it
required such an investigation. 8
The reason usually given for not deciding theological
questions is the plea of judicial incompetence. 29 Theological
U.S. 595 (1979). By doing so it employs freedom of contract to override the
default rule in favor of local churches. But that is consistent with the
principle of individual freedom.
24. Naturally, it is hard to divide the property between two groups
when the major asset is the church and the land it stands on. Time-sharing is
a possibility. Kentucky actually has a statute that requires it. K.R.S.
§ 273.120. But it has been interpreted to apply only until a winner is chosen,
and only to property acquired by donation. SeeJones v.Johnson, 295 Ky. 707
175 S.W.2d 370 (1943); Thomas v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W.2d 255 (1928).
25. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
26. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-03; Maryland & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 368.
27. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-09, 712-24, 714 n.8 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94, 113-16 (1952).
28. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969).
29. Here is what the Court said in Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729:
Each of these [churches] . . . has a body of constitutional and
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disputes, it is often said, are simply too abstruse to be fairly and
judiciously adjudicated by civil courts. There is obviously
something to this. It would be hard for a judge to say whether
it was orthodox to assert "[t]hat the birth of the spirit is not
necessary except to see the church here in time; that there is no
hell beyond this life; and that goats are sheep in disobedi-
ence."' Such theological questions might be like political
questions, for which there are no "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards." 3 , or like questions committed to
agency discretion, for which there is "no law to apply." 2
I think there is more to it than that, though. After all, the
English courts decide such issues.33 The state courts did too,
until the Supreme Court told them to stop in 1969. 3' And not
all ecclesiastical questions are so mind-numbing that their
answers must be taken on faith. Quite apart from the question
of competence, there must be some affirmative reasons for not
wanting the courts to do theology. We can discover these by
considering why the Court rejected the departure-from-doc-
trine rule.
This rule actually had two parts. The first was the implied
trust doctrine, which held that property given to a church was
impressed with a trust in favor of the doctrines and usages pre-
vailing at the time of the contribution. 35  As the word
"implied" suggests, this was not a rule for carrying out a set-
tlor's intent. Calling the contribution a trust rather than a gift
was a fiction.36
ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their written organic
laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of precedents, in
their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of
ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to
become familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the judges of the
civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and
religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in
reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the
more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to
one which is less so.
30. Canterbury v. Canterbury, 100 S.E.2d 565, 569 (W. Va. 1957).
31. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
32. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971) (quoting S. Rep. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)).
33. See Note,Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property,
75 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1145-49 (1962).
34. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
35. Attorney General v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch.
1817); Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow. 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813).
36. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian
Church Case, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 347, 350.
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The second part of the rule was the departure-from-doc-
trine standard, which held that when there were property dis-
putes, courts should prefer the group faithful to the trust.17
This rule was not often applied to hierarchical churches. But
when it was, the general church usually won. Courts tended to
use denominational affiliation as a proxy for religious tenets (so
that leaving the general church was a departure from doctrine).
Besides, it was often a fundamental doctrine of hierarchical
churches that the hierarchy controlled doctrine. The rule was
applied more often to congregational churches. There it
allowed a local minority to prevail if the majority tried to
change denominations or renounce important theological
principles.38
Why was there this tendency to "imply" such trusts and
enforce them against departures from doctrine? The obvious
explanation is that the law saw churches as entities, defined by
doctrinal coherence, which ought to be held together. 9 To
put it bluntly, the law saw heresy as a bad thing, whether
because (i) it led to social instability, or (ii) it frustrated the pur-
poses of churches as legal persons,4" or perhaps (iii) it led to
damnation. I will have more to say about this point of view in
the next section. Now I want to emphasize just two things
about it. The first is its plainly undemocratic aspect. Its most
notable effects were to sustain the authoritarian character of
hierarchical churches and to permit rule by orthodox minori-
ties in congregational churches. The second is that it saw belief
as a social phenomenon. Courts did not actually decide where
revealed truth lay. But they did measure the beliefs of dispu-
tants against what their group had believed in the past, and
held for the side that clung to that social reality.
In Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church41 the Supreme Court
rejected the departure-from-doctrine standard. Hull Church is
an odd case, because it concerned a dispute in a hierarchical
church (where the departure-from-doctrine standard was not
often used), and even more so because the state court ruled in
favor of the local churches (which typically lost when the stan-
37. Id.
38. Note, supra note 33, at 1151-52, 1167-75.
39. See Kauper, supra note 36, at 355; Note, supra note 33, at 1168.
40. See Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 91 (1953).
41. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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dard was used).1 2 We have to abstract from those anomalies to
appreciate the true significance of the Court's decision.
The Court's explanation of why the departure-from-doc-
trine standard violated the first amendment was brief:
If civil courts undertake to resolve such [doctrinal] con-
troversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the
hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of
religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in
matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. 43
This assumes that the "free development of religious doctrine"
is something the first amendment is designed to promote.
That is not self-evident. Loosely translated, it means that her-
esy is a good thing.4 4 It may be,4 5 but not from the point of
view of the orthodox faithful. Behind the Court's assumption
about the virtue of heresy is the further assumption that the
first amendment stands in the shoes of the heretic. As the
Court has said in a related context, "the guarantee of free exer-
cise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the mem-
bers of a religious sect. ' 4 6 In other words, the freedom of
belief that the first amendment protects is that of individuals,
not groups.
The most obvious effect of Hull Church was to free congre-
gational majorities to believe as they like. They no longer need
to fear the charge that they have departed from doctrine, and
thus have lost the use of property dedicated to orthodox
beliefs. Rather, they are free to operate democratically and to
do what the majority wants. The case thus strikes a blow for
freedom of association as well as for freedom of belief.47
The case may have a similar effect within hierarchical
churches, though this is a subtle issue. Hull Church expressly
rejected the departure-from-doctrine standard. It did not,
however, expressly reject the implied trust doctrine.4s A court
can still rule that local church property is impressed with a trust
42. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690
(1968).
43. 393 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 446 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728
(1871) ("The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect.")).
45. The notion does have a familiar first amendment ring about it. See
Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, supra note 20, at 92.
46. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981). See also United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
47. Kauper, supra note 36, at 375.
48. 393 U.S. at 449-50.
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in favor of the general church. The general church will then
prevail in property disputes under either the rule of neutral
principles (which looks to trust law) or the rule of deference
(which looks to the church hierarchy). But state law may
require that the two parts of the rule stand or fall together.
This is what the Georgia courts said on the remand of Hull
Church.49 In that event there will be no trust in favor of the
general church. When a dispute arises, the Church's property
will be pulled away by centrifugal force.5 °
III. GROUP FREEDOM
I now want to look at a very different kind of explanation
for the Court's behavior in this area. It is this: the freedom the
law seeks to protect is not the freedom of individual church
members but the freedom of churches as groups. The group is
a legal and moral person distinct from its members; its interests
may conflict with theirs. Its freedom is not a compound of indi-
vidual liberties, like the effort of ten horses drawing a single
load;51 it is a right to act in ways peculiar to the group. The
freedoms of association, belief, and contract discussed in Sec-
tion II play no part in this scheme of things.
Cases applying the rule of deference sometimes make this
view explicit. In such cases, the central authority in a hierarchi-
cal church disputes the ownership of property with a schismatic
local church. The property dispute has arisen from a disagree-
ment over some point of theological doctrine or ecclesiastical
governance. The rule of deference requires that a court decide
in favor of the general church. (More accurately, it requires a
court to respect the disposition of the case decreed by the high-
est authority within the general church.) The reason usually
given is that the free exercise rights of the organization require
that outcome.
Consider Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.52
The dispute there concerned the property and assets of the
American-Canadian Diocese. One of the contending parties
49. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167
S.E.2d 658 (1969).
50. Thus it is no accident that the Presbyterian Church in the United
States, though it won the battle in Hull Church, ultimately lost the war ih the
case, and in the next case to come before the Supreme Court. See Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 599-601 (1979).
51. See W. HOHFELD, supra note 19, at 199-200 n.14. See also Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
52. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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was the Serbian Orthodox Church, an episcopal church gov-
erned by the Holy Assembly of Bishops (which had legislative
and judicial authority) and the Holy Synod (an executive body).
The Church was opposed by the diocesan bishop, whom the
Synod had suspended and the Assembly had defrocked for acts
of defiance. The Court held for the general church, saying:
[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierar-
chical religious organizations to establish their own rules
and regulations for internal discipline and government,
and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over
these matters. When this choice is exercised ... the Con-
stitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions
as binding upon them.53
The split in Milivojevich is similar to the split within the
Russian Orthodox Church at issue in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral.54 The cathedral was held by a New York corporation,
and New York had passed a statute giving the local archbishop
(Leonty) beneficial use of the property. Leonty had been cho-
sen by the American churches, which began to act on their own
after the Russian Revolution because the Moscow hierarchy
was in some disarray. After the turmoil subsided, the Mother
Church appointed its own candidate (Benjamin) as archbishop.
Benjamin disputed with Leonty over the right to use the cathe-
dral. The Court held that the case turned on the principle of
freedom for religious organizations . . .[the] power to decide
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.
Freedom to select the clergy . . . [is] a part of the free
exercise of religion ....
... New York's [statute] directly prohibits the free
exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the Church's choice of its
hierarchy.55
Commenting on this case, Mark DeWolfe Howe concluded that
this statement would have considerable significance if it were
taken seriously: "Not only does it imply that the Church as a
spiritual body has liberties which will be given protection
directly rather than derivatively, but it gives that protection to
liberties which, in their essence, differ from those possessed by
the members of the Church." 5
6
53. Id. at 724-25 (emphasis added).
54. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
55. Id. at 116, 119 (emphasis added).
56. Howe, supra note 40, at 92.
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The Orthodox Church cases are not the only evidence for
this view. In fact, with the exception of two recent cases
stressing the importance of neutral principles, 57 one might
fairly say that it has been a dominant theme in the Court's han-
dling of church property disputes.5" But the Court has never
tried to explain how a church group can have its own free exer-
cise right, separate and distinct from the rights of its members.
That is the question I now want to explore.
A. Alternatives to Contract
The principle of individual freedom holds that individuals
form groups by contracting together. But this is not how many
people join religious groups. One often becomes a member
without doing any conscious act. A child of Jewish parents is
born a Jew.59 The rite of initiation for Christian churches is
baptism, which is often administered to infants. The effect of
baptism is usually understood to be permanent. It is not like a
contract that can be breached, nullified, or rescinded. One
who leaves the church and then reenters would not be
rebaptized.6"
Freedom of contract is a way of exercising and enlarging
the autonomy of the individual contractors. The good envi-
sioned by autonomy is that of choosing one's own "life as a free
and rational being."'" But that is not necessarily what people
who join religious groups think they are doing. They might say
that they are not choosing their own lives-it is God who
chooses them, sometimes whether they like it or not. Jews con-
57. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Maryland & Va. Churches v.
Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
58. See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448 (1969);
Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); cf. Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S.
296 (1908).
Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872), involved a dispute
within a congregational (Baptist) church. As I explained in Section I, such
cases are consistent with a rule of deference because the church itself gives
authority to the majority. Thus in Bouldin the Court set out to "inquire
whether the resolution [by which a minority took control of the property] was
the act of the church ...... It concluded that it was not, because in "a
congregational church, the majority, if they adhere to the organization and to
the doctrines, represent the church." Id. at 140.
59. R. SCHERER, AMERICAN DENOMINATIONAL ORGANIZATION: A
SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 131 (1980).
60. See, e.g., R. McBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 739-40, 751 (1981).
61. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument
for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1226 (1979).
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sider themselves the "chosen people."62 Christians frequently
speak of themselves as having been 'called' by God. (St. Paul
says that he was stricken to the ground and blinded so that he
would get the point.63 )
The faith to which many Christians say they are called is
generally spoken of as a gift from God.6 4 Of course they must
assent. But the nature of God's demands may undermine the
very notion of autonomy, because God is often understood to
demand submission of the individual's intellect and will.65
These ideas about baptism and faith are hard to reconcile
with individualist notions of freedom of contract and auton-
omy. 66 Contract principles do not explain the bonds that unite
many individuals to their churches. Nor is autonomy the good
that they seek injoining. In the case of infant baptism, it seems
that the churches are playing an active role of their own-
reaching out to claim members. In some descriptions of faith it
seems as though the individual plays a passive role-being
called and giving over her will to God. The idea of churches as
non-associative groups, to which I now turn, helps to explain
these anomalies.
B. Alternatives to Association
Freedom of association has several distinctive qualities. It
envisions a group that is identical to the sum of its members.
The group is held together by contracts among the members.
When there is dissent that the contracts do not resolve, the
group must rely on majority rule or split up. (Those solutions
respect the individualist assumptions underlying the group.)
Individuals associate in this way to advance their own interests
by concerted action. The group is thus a procedural device for
62. See Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 779, 791-92 (1986).
63. Acts 9:3-20.
64. John 6:44-46, 6:65 ("No one can come to me unless the Father who
sent me draws him"); Ephesians 2:8 ("[Slalvation is yours through faith. This
is not your own doing, it is God's gift"); Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic
Constitution on Divine Revelation ch. 1, art. 5 (1965).
65. Luke 22:42 ("[Nlot my will, [Lord,] but thine").
66. I do not mean to suggest that the views I have mentioned are
standard across Christian denominations. There are sects whose norms are
more compatible with autonomy and freedom of contract than the examples I
have used. See, e.g., Smucker, Rauschenbusch's View of the Church as a Dynamic
Voluntary Association, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: A STUDY OF GROUPS IN
FREE SOCIETIES 159 (D. Robertson ed. 1966); Gustafson, The Voluntary Church:
A Moral Appraisal, in id. at 299.
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coordinating large numbers of similar interests and amplifying
individual efforts.
People do not look at churches (particularly hierarchical
ones) in this way. The church is usually viewed as a kind of
unified whole, different from the sum of its parts. The glue
that holds it together is not contractual. The method for deal-
ing with dissent is often not majoritarian or democratic. The
church is thought to be something real with a good of its own,
not a procedural device for advancing members' interests.
Consider first the idea of the church's unity and distinct-
ness. This understanding of what a church is is expressed by a
variety of metaphors. One is the idea that the church is the
"body of Christ":
For Christ is like a single body with its many limbs and
organs, which, many as they are, together make up one
body. For indeed we are all brought into one body by
baptism, in the one Spirit, whether we are Jews or
Greeks, whether slaves or free men[.]67
This suggests a unified, organic whole, and something more.68
The body is animated by the Holy Spirit.69 And Christ is the
head. 7' These contributions, which keep the body going, are
not made by the individual members.
Another metaphor for the same idea is that the church is
the "people of God."-7 l This comparison, though political
rather than biological, stresses the same themes of unity and
distinctness. The notion of the "people of God" is not Chris-
tian but Jewish in origin. Israel understood itself as the people
of God, called by God. 72 But the people were a whole, a corpo-
rate personality. "The individual [took] on meaning, impor-
tance, and even destiny insofar as the individual [was] involved
with the people."' T7 Many Christians understand their churches
in the same way. Consider Rudolf Bultmann's description:
Not the individual but the "church" is called, to it
belongs the promise. . . . [T]he individual . . . finds
67. Corinthians 12:13. For a useful bibliography on the idea, see H.
KUNG, THE CHURCH 225 (1967).
68. 0. VON GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAw: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY
CHRISTIAN STAGES 145 (G. Heiman ed. 1977).
69. Ephesians 4:4.
70. Ephesians 5:23; Colossians 1:18, 2:19.
71. See Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church ch. 2
(1964); A. DULLES, MODELS OF THE CHURCH 47-62 (1978).
72. Exodus 6:7, 19:5, 23:22; Deuteronomy 7:6, 14:2, 26:18.
73. R. MCBRIEN, supra note 60, at 593; E. GARDNER, THE CHURCH AS A
PROPHETIC COMMUNITY 111-12 (1967).
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deliverance, but only because he belongs to the ... com-
munity, not because of his personality. 4
These metaphors do not imply that individual members
are fused into one homogeneous lump. Churches do have
members. But as I explained above, the members are not held
together by contracts. Nor do they always govern themselves
in the democratic, majoritarian ways typical of voluntary
associations. Consider what the Roman Catholic Code of
Canon Law has to say about the Pope:
The bishop of the Church of Rome... is head of the
college of bishops, the Vicar of Christ and Pastor of the
universal Church on earth; therefore, in virtue of his
office he enjoys supreme, full, immediate and universal
ordinary power in the Church, which he can always freely
exercise ....
There is neither appeal nor recourse against a deci-
sion or decree of the Roman Pontiff.7
5
The Protestant Episcopal Church at the national level is
governed by the Presiding Bishop and the General Convention.
The General Convention is comprised of a House of Bishops
(which elects the Presiding Bishop, subject to confirmation by
the other House) and a House of Deputies (to which each dio-
cese sends equal numbers of clergy and lay people). 76 Though
the structure parallels a political government with a chief exec-
utive and a bicameral legislature, it is obvious that individual
lay members do not exercise sovereign authority over church
decisions.
Churches that have these characteristics (i.e. that are uni-
fied, distinct, non-associative) are not just procedural devices
for aggregating individual actions. To say that they are "per-
sons" is not a legal fiction. 77 They are, as Frederick Maitland
said, "an ultimate and unanalysable moral unit: as ultimate and
unanalysable, I mean, as is the man."78 I have been arguing
that churches are units, ultimate and unanalysable. I now want
to address the sense in which they can be considered "moral"
units.
74. R. BULTMAN, JESUS AND THE WORD 47 (1958).
75. 1983 CODE c.331, 333, § 3.
76. Sirico, Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions
55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 340 (1986).
77. See F. HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY Pt. I, ch. 1 (1930).
78. 3 F.W. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 319 (1911).
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C. Alternatives to Individual Belief
I said in Section II that the Supreme Court has often
treated freedom of belief as applicable only to individuals.
Here I will contend that churches as groups may also claim a
right to the free exercise of religion. This is what I mean by
saying that they can be "moral" units.
It is revealing to note that, regarding the ecclesiastical tur-
moil we are considering, fights are always over a church.
Churches (buildings) symbolize the idea that it is good to wor-
ship God as a group. We need to make certain theological
assumptions to explain why that should be. But the first point
to notice is that people believe it to be so. Those who believe it
is good to worship God as a group disagree with Justice Doug-
las's claim that "[r]eligion is an individual experience."-7 9
I will confine my theological speculations about why we
build churches to one example which suffices to make my point.
The Roman Catholic tradition maintains that the church (as a
group) acts as a mediator between God and his people. As one
theologian expresses it, "God's relationship to us and our rela-
tionship to God is not exclusively, nor even primarily, individ-
ual and personal. It is corporate and communal." What the
Catholic church calls sacraments are "actions which the Church
performs, or means by which the Church makes grace avail-
able."8" They are, in other words, understood as group actions,
which an individual cannot perform.
A second kind of group action that people attribute to
churches occurs within the group. Dietrich Bonhoeffer
describes the church as an interpersonal community: "The
community is constituted by the complete self-forgetfulness of
love. The relationship between I and thou is no longer essen-
tially a demanding but a giving one."8 Here the action takes
place on a horizontal rather than a vertical plane. The acts in
question are not specific, ritualized observances, but something
more like the activities that take place in families. These activi-
ties result in love between the members, an interpersonal
rather than individual good.
79. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
80. R. McBRIEN, supra note 60, at 731, 733.
81. D. BONHOEFFER, THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS 123 (1963).
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IV. Two RULES, Two PRINCIPLES
I have explained that the law for dealing with church prop-
erty disputes involves two rules and two principles. The two
rules are: (i) neutral principles and (ii) deference. The two
principles are (i) individual freedom and (ii) group freedom. In
this Section I will argue that we should resolve all such disputes
by using rule (ii) and principle (ii).
It would be tidy if I could begin by saying that there was a
natural correspondence between the rules and principles-that
neutral principles was married to individual freedom, and def-
erence was married to group freedom. That is largely true but
not entirely so. This is how they match up:
(Ri, Pi) The rule of neutral principles is perfectly consis-
tent with individual freedom. The first part of the rule
relies on property and trust law for disputes between
general and local churches. This avoids inquiry into mat-
ters of belief, which are by hypothesis private. It also
promotes association in smaller groups by letting local
churches win more often. The second part of the rule is a
presumption of majority rule within local churches. This
also promotes freedom of association. Finally, neutral
principles promote freedom of contract by allowing
churches and members to override the default rules by
advance agreement.
(Ri, Pii) The rule of neutral principles often frustrates
the goal of group freedom. The first part of the rule
pulls local churches away from hierarchical organizations
in cases where the rule of deference would not. The sec-
ond part imposes majority rule on noncongregational
churches that cannot rebut the presumption.
(Rii, Pi) I said in Section II that the rule of deference can
be seen as a way of promoting individual freedom. The
rule binds dissenting members to the dictates of hierar-
chical church authorities, but this might follow from the
dissenters' freedom of contract. Deference also requires
majority rule in congregational churches, which pro-
motes freedom of association.
I must now qualify those claims in light of my conclu-
sions in Section III. We cannot rely on freedom of con-
tract to justify hierarchical church rules if members do
not contract in. The rule of deference in such organiza-
tions may simply be inconsistent with the principle of
individual freedom.
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Moreover, the rule for congregational churches is
not entirely consistent with the principle of individual
freedom. Majority rule is democratic, but in church sch-
isms it leaves the minority with nothing. Respect for the
individual would seem to require a more even distribu-
tion of church assets. Clearly there is another principle
at work.
(Rii, Pi) The rule of deference matches quite well with
the principle of group freedom. Both rule and principle
say that courts should permit religious groups to act as
they wish, and to resolve their own problems in their own
way.
In short, there does seem to be a fairly natural correspon-
dence between Ri and Pi, and between Rii and Pii. Stated more
elaborately, the rule of neutral principles serves the goal of
individual freedom; the rule of deference, the goal of group
freedom. But there are still two matters unresolved. The first
concerns the principle of group freedom. In a church schism
there are, by definition, different contending groups. Why
should the principle prefer one group over another? The sec-
ond matter is even more fundamental: How can the law choose
between group and individual freedom?
A. Which Group Counts?
The rule of deference prefers the general church over the
local church in hierarchical organizations. It prefers the major-
ity over the minority in congregational organizations. But lib-
eral political philosophy holds that the government must treat
all persons as worthy of equal concern and respect. Maybe the
same should go for groups. It seems illiberal to make judg-
ments about the worthiness of groups, particularly when there
is an alternative. The rule of neutral principles is "neutral"
precisely because it is indifferent to the identity of the parties
before the court.82
This statement of the matter misses the point. The rule of
deference does not prefer certain groups because their status
makes them more worthy. It does not say, for example, that
the Presbyterian hierarchy should prevail because it is more
pleasing in the sight of God and the law than is a group of local
apostates. The outcome in such a case rests on a judgment
about freedom, not equality. The general church prevails
because that is the choice the formerly united group made, ex
82. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
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ante, for its own self-government. And the free exercise of reli-
gion protects the right to make and carry out choices about
ecclesiastical governance.
One might contend that the local church is making a differ-
ent choice about ecclesiastical governance now, and that its
choices are deserving of the same respect. For the future they
are. But the locals were members of the larger group when it
decided that the highest church court had the last word on
property disputes, and are thus bound by that choice for all
disputes that arose before they severed ties. They are not
bound because they made a contract to that effect. There is no
contract. They are bound because they were members, and
church groups exercise sovereign authority over their members
in religious matters.
B. Why Prefer Group Freedom?
But there is an assumption hidden in my conclusion that
church groups exercise sovereign authority over their mem-
bers. I am not just describing a set of practices to which com-
muning members adhere. I am saying that the law should
recognize the group's primacy when a member has left and
wants to undo the effect of a group choice. This is a proposi-
tion of constitutional law, not just of church governance: under
the first amendment the freedom of groups should prevail over
individual freedom in cases where the two conflict. Why
should this be?
There are two kinds of reasons for preferring the freedom
of church groups over the freedom of individual members.
The first kind relies upon a general social benefit. The second
focuses on the return to those who form church groups.
Zechariah Chafee, writing about the internal affairs of non-
profit associations in general, proffered the first kind of reason:
The health of society will usually be promoted if the
groups within it which serve the industrial, mental, and
spiritual needs of citizens are genuinely alive. Like indi-
viduals, they will usually do most for the community if
they are free to determine their own lives for the present
and the future.... Legal supervision must often be with-
held for fear that it may do more harm than good.83
We need not look very hard to discover how church groups
promote the health of society. " '[C]hurch and religious
83. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 993, 1027 (1930).
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groups in the United States have long exerted powerful polit-
ical pressures on state and national legislatures, on subjects as
diverse as slavery, war, gambling, drinking, prostitution, mar-
riage, and education.' " 8 4
More broadly, the social benefit of organized religion is
not confined to its influence on the legislature.8 5 Indeed, in
many ways its most useful public service is the protection of
individuals against the legislature and other organs of govern-
ment. Religious groups are one of the most important of those
associations that stand intermediate between the individual and
the state, and provide a buffer that is the best protection for
personal freedom:
Totalitarianism has been well described as the ultimate
invasion of human privacy. But this invasion of privacy is
possible only after the social contexts of privacy-family,
church, association-have been atomized. The political
enslavement of man requires the emancipation of man
from all the authorities and memberships . . . that serve,
in one degree or another, to insulate the individual from
external political power.86
It sounds rather establishmentarian to suggest that we
should adopt a rule in favor of churches in order to secure a
social benefit. But in this context there is no way of avoiding
this result. Both plaintiffs and defendants in these cases repre-
sent religious claimants, and courts must rule in somebody's
favor. The question is really whether we prefer the social bene-
fits of individual or of group religion.
There is, however, a second kind of reason for preferring
the freedom of church groups over the freedom of individual
members. This is simply that that is what the participants in
the practice generally want. Those who are devoted to commu-
nitarian forms of religious life believe that the ends of group
worship-the good pursued by their group-afe more impor-
tant than individual aspirations. As I explained in Section III,
84. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 n.25 (1978)(Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 866-67
(1978)).
85. See R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON,
HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE
(1985); C. MOONEY, PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF
RELIGION (1986); B. WILSON, RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 34
(1982); H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974).
86. R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 202 (1953) (emphasis
omitted). See Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 299, 332 & n.138.
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members of such churches think that the individual finds mean-
ing and importance in the fact of belonging to a particular com-
munity. And the kinds of actions that freedom protects-
bringing grace and love to community members-are things
that can only be understood as group actions.
It is more difficult to reconcile this justification with the
establishment clause. The argument seems to' be that the law
should prefer one view of religion over another because of its
religious merits. But my claim is actually more modest. The
rule of deference, like the rule of neutral principles, is only a
"default" rule. Religious individuals are free to affiliate with
and contribute to the religious group that best embodies their
views of God and church. In particular, they can reject hierar-
chical churches that show too little respect for individual free-
dom. Moreover, the members of any religious group
(hierarchical or congregational) remain free, in advance of a
dispute, to provide for any disposition of property that suits
them. I only suggest that, when they fail to do so, we should
allow groups to resolve their own disputes and enforce the out-
comes on which they settle.
But should the law favor one view of religion over another
even in that narrower class of cases? I think so. It seems to me
profoundly unrealistic to pretend as though the free exercise
clause is not designed to secure the kind of freedom that its
beneficiaries want. And the rule of deference just adopts the
predominant view of what they want.
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